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Elige la vida, elige un empleo, elige una carrera, elige una familia, elige un televisor grande que te cagas, elige lavadoras, coches, equipos de compact disc y abrelatas electricos. Elige la sal, colesterol bajo y seguros dentales, elige pagar hipotecas a interés fijo, elige un piso piloto, elige a tus amigos. Elige ropa deportiva y maletas a juego, elige pagar a plazos un traje de marca en una amplia gama de putos tejidos, elige el bricolaje y preguntate quién coño eres los domingos por la mañana, elige sentarte en el sofa a ver tele-concursos que embotan la mente y aplastan el espíritu, mientras llenas tu boca de puta comida basura, elige pudrirte de viejo, cagándote y meándote encima, en un asilo miserable, siendo una carga para los niñatos egoistas y hechos polvo que has engendrado para reemplazarte, elige tu futuro, elige la vida. Pero ¿porqué iba yo a querer hacer algo asi?. Yo eligí no elegir la vida, yo elegi otra cosa. ¿Y las razones?, ¡no hay razones!. ¿Quién necesita razones cuando tienes heroína?

From Trainspotting by Irvine Welsh.

 

Choose life. Choose a job. Choose a career. Choose a family. Choose a fucking big television, Choose washing machines, cars, compact disc players, and electrical tin openers. Choose good health, low cholesterol and dental insurance. Choose fixed- interest mortgage repayments. Choose a starter home. Choose your friends. Choose leisure wear and matching luggage. Choose a three piece suite on hire purchase in a range of fucking fabrics. Choose DIY and wondering who you are on a Sunday morning. Choose sitting on that couch watching mind-numbing sprit-crushing game shows, stuffing fucking junk food into your mouth. Choose rotting away at the end of it all, pishing you last in a miserable home, nothing more than an embarrassment to the selfish, fucked-up brats you have spawned to replace yourself. Choose your future. Choose life... But why would I want to do a thing like that? I chose not to choose life: I chose something else. And the reasons? There are no reasons. Who need reasons when you've got heroin?

De Trainspotting de Irvine Welsh.

 

Bizitza aukeratu, lanpostua aukeratu, karrera aukeratu, familia aukeratu, telebista benetan handia aukeratu, garbigailuak aukeratu, kotxeak, compact disk-ekipoak eta poto-irekigailu elektrikoak. Gatza aukeratu, kolesterol baxua eta hortzetako asegurua, interes-tasa finkoko hipotekak ordaintzea aukeratu, etxebizitza pilotua aukeratu, zure lagunak aukeratu. Kirolezko arropa eta ondo ematen duten maletak aukeratu, ehun-aukera lupu batetik markazko jantzi bat epetan ordaintzea aukeratu, brikolajea aukeratu eta ea nor demontre zaren galdeiozu zeure buruari goizetik igandero. Sofan esertzea, burua traketsen eta arima zapaltzen duten programak ikusteko, ahoa otordu laster lupuz betetzen duzun bitartean aukeratu.

Parámetros :: Parameters :: Paramètres: Fuji FinePix SL1000 ; ISO 200; 0 ev; f 4.8; 1/200 s; 13.7 mm Fuji Lens. HSM.

 

Título :: Title :: Titre ::: Fecha (Date): La vida invertida :: The inverted life :: La vie inversée ::: 2017/01/01 14:57

 

Palabras Clave, Keywords: León, España, Fray, Dálmata, Reflejo, Reflection, Dalmatian, Réflexion, Dalmatien, Spain, Espagne.

 

(Es). Historia: León. España. Calle Juan Lorenzo Segura. En una mañana fría esperando a alguien durante unos minutos… lo mejor era ponerse al ligero calor del sol de mediodía de primeros de enero. Justo delante está una sucursal de CaixaBank en una zona de sombra, donde veo nuestro nítido reflejo. Estoy a este lado del espejo, donde es imposible leer el Galimatazo, el Fablistanón, el Jabberwocky de Lewis Carrol,. mientras veo la vida invertida en el cristal. ¿invertida?, qué coincidente que vea la vida invertida en una sucursal de un banco, precisamente en el que pesa aún una espesa hipoteca. Será porque esa CaixaBank ha invertido algo en nuestras vidas; algo nos estará llevando, al fin y al cabo somos su inversión.

 

Toma: Hacía frío, bastante frío; mal día para sujetar la cámara sin guantes. Mientras espero veo el reflejo, pero estoy mal colocado. Corrijo nuestra posición y encuadro en el visor. Miro al frente y espero a que Fray mire a un lado. ¡Ya está!

 

Tratamiento: Con Lightroom. Original en RAW. Hay zonas en la escena que sobran en la imagen final, así que recorto sin preocuparme demasiado de las dimensiones finales. Modifico luces y tonos, subo ligeramente la saturación para ganar un poco de viveza en el reflejo. Las sombras y negros los oscurezco aún más para destacar la zona reflejada. Un poco de definición para ganar textura en la pared iluminada por el sol.

 

¡Eso es todo amigos!

 

(En). The History: León. Spain. Juan Lorenzo Segura Street. On a cold morning waiting for someone for a few minutes ... the best option was to get into that light heat of the midday sun of early January. Just ahead is a CaixaBank office in a shaded area, where I see our clear reflection. I am on this side of the mirror, where it is impossible to read the Galdick, the Fablistanon, the Lewis Carrol Jabberwocky. While I see the life invested in the glass. Inverted? How much of a chance you see the life invested in a branch of a bank, precisely in which we still weigh a heavy mortgage. It will be because that CaixaBank has invested something in our lives; Something will be taking us, after all we are investment of the Bank.

 

Taking up: It was cold, quite cold; Bad day to hold the camera without gloves. While I wait I see the reflection, but we are misplaced. I correct our position and frame in the viewfinder. I look at the front and wait for Fray to look to the side. It is done!

 

Treatment: With Lightroom. Original in RAW. There are areas in the scene that are not necessary in the final image, so I cut without worrying too much about the final dimensions. Changing lights and tones, I slightly raise the saturation to gain a bit of vividness in the reflection. The shadows and blacks obscure them even more to highlight the reflected area. A little definition to gain texture on the wall illuminated by the sun.

 

That's all folks !!

 

(Fr). Histoire: León. L'Espagne. Rue Juan Lorenzo Segura. Un matin froid en attendant que quelqu'un pendant quelques minutes ... la meilleure option était de se rendre à la légère chaleur du soleil de midi au début de Janvier. Tout est en avance un bureau de CaixaBank dans une zone ombragée où je vois notre réflexion claire. Je suis de ce côté du miroir, où il est impossible de lire le Galimatazo, le Fablistanón, le Jabberwocky de Lewis Carrol,. Je vois la vie comme investi dans le verre. ¿Inversé?, Ce que vous voyez la vie inversée dans une succursale d'une banque, précisément où nous pèse encore une hypothèque lourde. Ce sera parce que CaixaBank a investi quelque chose dans nos vies; quelque chose va nous prendre à la fin de la journée sont l'investissement de la Banque.

 

Prendre: Il faisait froid, très froid; mauvaise journée pour tenir la caméra sans gants. Pendant que j'attends que je vois le reflet, mais sont mal placées. Encuadro corriger notre position et dans le viseur. Je suis impatient et espère voir Fray de côté. Vous avez terminé!

 

Traitement: Avec Lightroom. Original RAW. Il y a des zones de la scène qui ne sont pas nécessaires dans l'image finale, alors je coupe sans se soucier trop des dimensions finales. Changement de lumières et de sons, la saturation grimper légèrement pour gagner un peu de vivacité dans la réflexion. Les ombres noires et assombrissent encore plus pour mettre en évidence la zone réfléchie. Une petite définition pour rendre la texture sur le mur ensoleillé.

 

Voilà, c'est tout!

  

(Better at big size)

 

Always I try not to place here the same photos that I upload to my Fotolog. I try they to be different, independent, those probably more experimental, more rapid, more "textual". That one is a more intimate diary than this. But in certain occasions, I do some photo that I like so much that it becomes me very difficult to choose in what flog to put it. This one has been one of these occasions, and I like this photo so much, that I have decided to repeat it in both sites.

 

It was this last Sunday. An absolutely pacific demonstration done by Spanish young people in different cities, to complain for the highest prices that the housing has in Spain nowadays. For the unstoppable corruption and the speculation that invade the real-estate world dominated by turbid business among banks and real estate agencies, and mortgages to be paid even by your future children, incredible prices, and precarious salaries.

 

With a lot of luck, and in spite of not being an official demonstration, the security forces did not intervene too much, and these almost 2.000 young people could walk calmly along the principal streets of Madrid: the Paseo de la Castellana and the Gran Via, collapsing the traffic, and stopping the whole traffic. A real event, which called the attention of the mass media and it was it what was mattering fundamentally. Though it is necessary to admit that there was no almost organization, the march was chaotic in occasions, and the general final image probably was of that it had a question as an infantile fit, a childish act. Maybe the politicians attend in certain way to these childish acts, some day. Though the money that moves all these business, will support more than one of a covered mouth, and more than one tied hand, in such a way that there are neither inspections nor new laws. A sorrow, the human ambition and greed…

 

The photo attracts me very much, because it looks like to me a kind of fresh painting, a mixture of hyperrealism (the light and the color have a touch to the painter Antonio Lopez, who in fact has realized hyperrealistic pictures on the Gran Via), with a collage. It is full of small details, the faces, the expressions, the clothes, the lights, the signs, the shades, the buildings, the semaphores, the police at background… If the look is extended a bit (it´s better seen at big size), new situations and things are discovered to every moment. The street, besides, is an emblematic street of Madrid. The small Broadway of Madrid, the street of the cinemas and the shops. And because of it, to see it paralyzed, his causeway invaded by so many people, it is one curious, unforgettable sight, almost of a movie.

 

[Photo taken at 5/16/2006, during a demonstration for the Worthy Housing for the young people. Manipulations of light and color, with Photoshop]

  

*****************

  

(Más detalles viendo la foto a un tamaño más grande)

 

Siempre intento no colocar aquí las mismas fotos que subo a mi Fotolog. Procuro que sean distintas, independientes, aquellas quizás más experimentales, más rápidas, más “textuales”. Aquel es un diario más íntimo que este. Pero en determinadas ocasiones, hago alguna foto que me gusta tanto que se me hace muy difícil elegir en qué flog ponerla. Esta ha sido una de esas ocasiones, y esta foto me gusta tanto, que he decidido repetirla en los dos sitios.

 

Es de este domingo pasado. Una manifestación absolutamente pacífica, hecha por jóvenes españoles en distintas ciudades, para quejarse por los elevadísimos precios que tiene la vivienda en España actualmente. Por la corrupción y la especulación imparables que invaden el mundo inmobiliario, dominado por negocios turbios entre bancos e inmobiliarias, hipotecas a pagar incluso por tus hijos, precios increíbles, y sueldos precarios.

 

Con mucha suerte, y a pesar de no ser una manifestación oficial, las fuerzas de seguridad no intervinieron demasiado, y estos casi 2.000 jóvenes pudieron caminar tranquilamente por las principales calles de Madrid: el Paseo de la Castellana y la Gran Vía, colapsando el tráfico, y parando toda la circulación. Un verdadero acontecimiento, que llamó la atención de los medios de comunicación y era eso lo que importaba fundamentalmente. Aunque hay que admitir que no hubo casi organización, la marcha fue caótica en ocasiones, y la imagen general final quizás fue de que se había tratado de una pataleta infantil, una chiquillada. Ojalá que los políticos atiendan en cierto modo a estas chiquilladas, algún día. Aunque el dinero que mueve todos estos negocios, mantendrá mas de una boca tapada, y más de una mano atada, de tal modo que no haya inspecciones ni nuevas leyes. Una pena, la ambición y la codicia humana…

 

La foto me atrae muchísimo, porque me parece una especie de fresco, una mezcla de hiperrealismo (la luz y el color tienen un toque al pintor Antonio López, que de hecho ha realizado cuadros hiperrealistas sobre la Gran Vía), con un collage. Está llena de pequeños detalles, las caras, las expresiones, las ropas, las luces, los letreros, las sombras, los edificios, los semáforos, la policía al fondo… Si se amplía un poco la mirada, se descubren nuevas situaciones y cosas a cada momento. La calle, además, es una calle emblemática de Madrid. El pequeño Broadway madrileño, la calle de los cines y las tiendas. Y por eso, verla paralizada, su calzada invadida por tanta gente, es un visión curiosa, inolvidable, casi de película.

 

[Foto tomada el 16/5/2006, durante una manifestación por la Vivienda Digna para los jóvenes. Manipulaciones de luz y color, con Photoshop]

 

¿Se han parado a pensar que a veces, es más difícil el segundo paso que el primero?

El segundo puede significar el último, el definitivo, o el paso consolidado.

 

Hay hombres que llegan a una edad emocional en la que no saben bien ubicarse; hablo de ubicarse entre la peor de las adolescencias (indiferencia social, indiferencia laboral, indiferencia económica, unica fijación por las drogas, el sexo y el R'N'R ...) o ubicarse entre la peor de las edades de madurez como persona, (la hipoteca, el trabajo, la pareja, el dinero ...).

 

Supongo que todo esto tiene poco sentido si miras a las nubes de la misma manera que 10 años atras, y haces balance. ¿No les ha ocurrido alguna vez, que queda más latente ese sentimiento casi perdido de antaño, que el padecido recientemente?

 

Imagino que el paso del tiempo es relativo, si uno se fija sólo en los relojes. Imagino que las nubes son personas, que van y vienen, y descargan lluvia, le quitan protagonismo al Sol, o empapelan el cielo a modo de elemento estático.

 

Pensando en todo esto, acabo de arme cuenta que odio a los que sueñan, y lo que es peor, a los que te hacen particpes de tus sueños. Odio a los que escriben plegarias en la parte trasera de la puerta de un lavabo público, a los que dibujan corazones en la arena de la playa, a los que miran la nubes con indiferencia emocional haciendo una "Oda" por ello. Odio las idas y venidas acompañadas por vértigos periféricos, el egocentrismo, y la falta de tacto a la hora de hablar de AMOR, que al fin y al cabo, si bien lo piensas ... sólo es ROMA, pero escrito al revés.

 

Y digo yo, ¿Tanto odio acabará matándome? ... y si no me mata ... ¿Me hará más fuerte? ... ¿Véis?, odiaría que eso lo escribiese alguien en la puerta de una letrina ...

 

En fin, les haré una última advertencia, por si estas palabras no se pierden por las nubes: si se cruzan conmigo, no duden en venir a darme un beso en la mejilla, tal vez un abrazo ... no muerdo, al menos, de momento.

    

" No soy yo quien escucha

ese trote llovido que atraviesa mis venas.

 

No soy yo quien pasa la lengua entre los labios,

al sentir que la boca se me llena de arena.

 

No soy yo quien espera,

enredado en mis nervios,

que las horas me acerquen el alivio del sueño,

ni el que está con mis manos, de yeso enloquecido,

mirando, entre mis huesos, las áridas paredes.

 

No soy yo quien escribe estas palabras huérfanas "

  

............

  

They have been stopped to think that sometimes, the second step is more difficult that first? The second can mean the last one, the definitive one, or the consolidated step. There are men who arrive at an emotional age in which they do not know well to be located; I speak to be located between the worse of the adolescences (social indifference, labor indifference, economic indifference, unica fixation by drugs, sex and the R'N'R...) or to be located between the worse one of the ages of maturity like person, (the mortgage, the work, the pair, the money...). I suppose that all this has little sense if in the same way sights to the clouds that 10 years ago, and beams balance. It has not happened to them sometimes, that is left that almost lost feeling of long ago more latent, which the suffered one recently? I imagine that the passage of time is relative, if one pays attention only to the clocks. I imagine that the clouds are people, who go and come, and unload rain, they clear protagonism to him to the Sun, or paper the sky as a static element. Thinking about all this, I finish of arms account that hatred to that they dream, and what is worse, to those than they do particpes to you of your dreams. Hatred to which write plegarias in the back part of the door of a public washbasin, to which they draw hearts in the sand of the beach, to that watch clouds with emotional indifference making a "Oda" for that reason. Hatred the goings and comings accompanied by peripheral annoying, the myself obsession, and the lack of tact at the time of speaking of LOVE, that after all, although you only think it... is EVOL, but written the other way around. And say I, As much I hate will end up killing to me? ... and if he does not kill to me... He will do more fort to me? ... Véis, it would hate that that wrote somebody in the door of a latrine... In short, I will do a last warning to them, in case these words are not lost by clouds: if they are crossed me, they do not doubt in coming to give a kiss me in the cheek, perhaps a hug... I do not bite, at least, at the moment. ...

  

" I am not who listen to that trote rained that crosses my veins. I who pass the language between the lips, when feeling am not that the mouth fills to me of sand. I who hope, romped in my nerves, which am not the hours approach the lightening to me of the dream, nor the one that is with my driven crazy plaster hands, watching, between my bones, the barren walls. I am not who write these orphaned words ...."

  

My name is Rose Jackson, just want to pick up my lawyer Mr Rafael Gomez from Hackensack, New Jersey, he did an awesome job with my divorce case, if you are looking for a very good lawyer your one-stop shop should be 259 Union Street in Hackensack.

---------------------------------------------

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Somerset County, Docket No. C-012005-18.

 

Joan Marie Hoffman, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

 

Robert T. Yusko argued the cause for respondent Caliber Home Loans (Perkins Coie LLP, attorneys; Robert T. Yusko, on the brief).

 

Eva K. Carey argued the cause for respondent J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (Bertone Piccini, LLP, attorneys; Eva K. Carey, of counsel and on the brief).

 

Before Judges Fasciale and Rose.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

 

PER CURIAM.

 

Plaintiff appeals from two orders: an April 30, 2018 order dismissing the amended complaint against defendant Caliber Home Loans (Caliber); and a June 8, 2018 order dismissing the complaint against defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase), improperly pled as J.P. Morgan Chase. Judge Margaret Goodzeit entered the orders and rendered comprehensive and thorough opinions. We affirm.

 

Almost eleven years ago, a bank instituted a residential foreclosure complaint against plaintiff, who immediately filed an answer contesting the bank's allegations. In November 2009, the bank obtained final judgment, which the court amended. The Sheriff then scheduled the sale of the property. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 petition, which stayed the sale. The bankruptcy court dismissed the petition in October 2016, and although the Sheriff re-listed the sale, plaintiff stayed it again by filing a Chapter 7 petition. The bankruptcy court lifted the stay, refusing to stay the sale any further, despite multiple applications by plaintiff.[1] Plaintiff filed this complaint in January 2018, and the Sheriff sale of the property occurred in June 2018.

 

In this complaint, plaintiff alleged she proposed to redeem the property in March 2010, Chase failed to respond, Caliber became the servicer of the loan in July 2015, and Caliber provided a pay-off figure to plaintiff in November 2017. The judge entered the orders under review dismissing the complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e), the entire controversy doctrine (ECD), res judicata, and collateral estoppel.

 

On appeal, plaintiff argues the judge erred by dismissing the complaint by relying on the ECD. Indeed, her merits brief focuses solely on the ECD, although at oral argument before us, she contended that the judge erroneously relied on the other bases for dismissing this case. Plaintiff urges us to reverse the orders and award her damages.

 

We conclude that plaintiff's contentions are without sufficient merit to warrant attention in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We reach that conclusion even considering plaintiff's new arguments on appeal, on the record that she expanded without court order. We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Goodzeit.

 

201-646-9799 | gomezlegal.com/NJ_Megans_Law_Charges_Crimes_Defense_Lawye... Megans Law Sexual Charges Offenses Crimes in NJ | How do I Appeal My Megan's Law Tier 2, 3 Classification, Designation, Rank, Rating, Score? | Appealing a Megan's Law Risk Assessment Scale Score Classification of Moderate High Risk | Megan's Law Internet Registry | Public Notification of Old Sex Crimes Offense | Expunging a Megan's Law Charge | Avoiding Jail for Sex with a Minor | Sexual offense with Jail Bait | What is Jail Bait | What if girl lied about her age? | Can I marry a Minor With Parent's Permission to Avoid Megan's Law Sex Crimes Endangering Welfare of Child Charges? | What is the age of consent for sex in NJ? | Is a 16 Year Old Legally Allowed to Give Consent to Have Sexual Intercourse with Man in His 20's | Can a Slutty Girl Accuse a Male of Rape/Sexual Assault Megan's Law Crimes if She's Having Sex/Screwing the Whole School and Neighborhood?

 

In New Jersey Megan's Law applies to individuals convicted of certain sexual crimes. The main purpose of Megan's Law is to monitor people convicted of these sexual offenses via registration requirements.

 

2C:7-2. Registration of sex offenders; definition; requirements; penalties.

2. a. (1) A person who has been convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason of insanity for commission of a sex offense as defined in subsection b. of this section shall register as provided in subsections c. and d. of this section.

 

(2) A person who in another jurisdiction is required to register as a sex offender and (a) is enrolled on a full-time or part-time basis in any public or private educational institution in this State, including any secondary school, trade or professional institution, institution of higher education or other post-secondary school, or (b) is employed or carries on a vocation in this State, on either a full-time or a part-time basis, with or without compensation, for more than 14 consecutive days or for an aggregate period exceeding 30 days in a calendar year, shall register in this State as provided in subsections c. and d. of this section.

 

(3) A person who fails to register as required under this act shall be guilty of a crime of the third degree.

 

b. For the purposes of this act a sex offense shall include the following:

 

(1) Aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:13-1 or an attempt to commit any of these crimes if the court found that the offender's conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior, regardless of the date of the commission of the offense or the date of conviction;

 

(2) A conviction, adjudication of delinquency, or acquittal by reason of insanity for aggravated sexual assault; sexual assault; aggravated criminal sexual contact; kidnapping pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:13-1; endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child pursuant to subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:24-4; endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to paragraph (3) or (4) or subparagraph (a) of paragraph (5) of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:24-4; luring or enticing pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1993, c.291 (C.2C:13-6); criminal sexual contact pursuant to N.J.S.2C:14-3b. if the victim is a minor; kidnapping pursuant to N.J.S.2C:13-1, criminal restraint pursuant to N.J.S.2C:13-2, or false imprisonment pursuant to N.J.S.2C:13-3 if the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent of the victim; knowingly promoting prostitution of a child pursuant to paragraph (3) or paragraph (4) of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:34-1; or an attempt to commit any of these enumerated offenses if the conviction, adjudication of delinquency or acquittal by reason of insanity is entered on or after the effective date of this act or the offender is serving a sentence of incarceration, probation, parole or other form of community supervision as a result of the offense or is confined following acquittal by reason of insanity or as a result of civil commitment on the effective date of this act;

 

(3) A conviction, adjudication of delinquency or acquittal by reason of insanity for an offense similar to any offense enumerated in paragraph (2) or a sentence on the basis of criteria similar to the criteria set forth in paragraph (1) of this subsection entered or imposed under the laws of the United States, this State or another state.

 

c. A person required to register under the provisions of this act shall do so on forms to be provided by the designated registering agency as follows:

 

(1) A person who is required to register and who is under supervision in the community on probation, parole, furlough, work release, or a similar program, shall register at the time the person is placed under supervision or no later than 120 days after the effective date of this act, whichever is later, in accordance with procedures established by the Department of Corrections, the Department of Human Services, the Juvenile Justice Commission established pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1995, c.284 (C.52:17B-170) or the Administrative Office of the Courts, whichever is responsible for supervision;

 

(2) A person confined in a correctional or juvenile facility or involuntarily committed who is required to register shall register prior to release in accordance with procedures established by the Department of Corrections, the Department of Human Services or the Juvenile Justice Commission and, within 48 hours of release, shall also register with the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which the person resides or, if the municipality does not have a local police force, the Superintendent of State Police;

 

(3) A person moving to or returning to this State from another jurisdiction shall register with the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which the person will reside or, if the municipality does not have a local police force, the Superintendent of State Police within 120 days of the effective date of this act or 10 days of first residing in or returning to a municipality in this State, whichever is later;

 

(4) A person required to register on the basis of a conviction prior to the effective date who is not confined or under supervision on the effective date of this act shall register within 120 days of the effective date of this act with the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which the person will reside or, if the municipality does not have a local police force, the Superintendent of State Police;

 

(5) A person who in another jurisdiction is required to register as a sex offender and who is enrolled on a full-time or part-time basis in any public or private educational institution in this State, including any secondary school, trade or professional institution, institution of higher education or other post-secondary school shall, within ten days of commencing attendance at such educational institution, register with the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which the educational institution is located or, if the municipality does not have a local police force, the Superintendent of State Police;

 

(6) A person who in another jurisdiction is required to register as a sex offender and who is employed or carries on a vocation in this State, on either a full-time or a part-time basis, with or without compensation, for more than 14 consecutive days or for an aggregate period exceeding 30 days in a calendar year, shall, within ten days after commencing such employment or vocation, register with the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which the employer is located or where the vocation is carried on, as the case may be, or, if the municipality does not have a local police force, the Superintendent of State Police;

 

(7) In addition to any other registration requirements set forth in this section, a person required to register under this act who is enrolled at, employed by or carries on a vocation at an institution of higher education or other post-secondary school in this State shall, within ten days after commencing such attendance, employment or vocation, register with the law enforcement unit of the educational institution, if the institution has such a unit.

 

d. (1) Upon a change of address, a person shall notify the law enforcement agency with which the person is registered and shall re-register with the appropriate law enforcement agency no less than 10 days before he intends to first reside at his new address. Upon a change of employment or school enrollment status, a person shall notify the appropriate law enforcement agency no later than five days after any such change. A person who fails to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency of a change of address or status in accordance with this subsection is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

 

(2) A person required to register under this act shall provide the appropriate law enforcement agency with information as to whether the person has routine access to or use of a computer or any other device with Internet capability. A person who fails to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency of such information or of a change in the person's access to or use of a computer or other device with Internet capability or who provides false information concerning the person's access to or use of a computer or any other device with Internet capability is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

 

e. A person required to register under paragraph (1) of subsection b. of this section or under paragraph (3) of subsection b. due to a sentence imposed on the basis of criteria similar to the criteria set forth in paragraph (1) of subsection b. shall verify his address with the appropriate law enforcement agency every 90 days in a manner prescribed by the Attorney General. A person required to register under paragraph (2) of subsection b. of this section or under paragraph (3) of subsection b. on the basis of a conviction for an offense similar to an offense enumerated in paragraph (2) of subsection b. shall verify his address annually in a manner prescribed by the Attorney General. One year after the effective date of this act, the Attorney General shall review, evaluate and, if warranted, modify pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L.1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.) the verification requirement. Any person who knowingly provides false information concerning his place of residence or who fails to verify his address with the appropriate law enforcement agency or other entity, as prescribed by the Attorney General in accordance with this subsection, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

 

f. Except as provided in subsection g. of this section, a person required to register under this act may make application to the Superior Court of this State to terminate the obligation upon proof that the person has not committed an offense within 15 years following conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term of imprisonment imposed, whichever is later, and is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.

 

g. A person required to register under this section who has been convicted of, adjudicated delinquent, or acquitted by reason of insanity for more than one sex offense as defined in subsection b. of this section or who has been convicted of, adjudicated delinquent, or acquitted by reason of insanity for aggravated sexual assault pursuant to subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:14-2 or sexual assault pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:14-2 is not eligible under subsection f. of this section to make application to the Superior Court of this State to terminate the registration obligation.

 

Under the direct form of notification, for Tier one offenders, notification is given only to the local police. Tier 2 offenders have direct notification go, in addition to local law enforcement, to schools, daycare centers and other community organizations that provide care for children or adults. Notification under this system can only go to those schools and organizations deemed by a court to be "likely to encounter the registrant." For Tier 3 offenders direct notification goes to all persons and groups receiving Tier 2 notice and to all neighbors of the registrant in the community who a court determines are "likely to encounter" him. Each time a registrant moves to a new residence s/he must re-register with local law enforcement authorities and the direct notification process, following a new hearing, is repeated.

 

In addition to notice going to persons "likely to encounter" an offender, notification is also disseminated under the State's Sex Offender Internet Registry Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:7-12, et seq.) for offenders who fall into several categories. The Internet Registry contains information pertaining to Tier 3 (high risk) offenders and, with certain exceptions, information pertaining to Tier 2 (moderate risk) offenders for whom a court orders community notification. The Internet Registry contains no information about offenders determined to be a Tier 1 (low risk) and for those Tier 2 (moderate risk) offenders as to whom a court ordered no notification (i.e., Tier 2 offenders with Tier 1 scope of notification). The Internet Registry Act also contains three exceptions. It excludes Tier 2 offenders whose sole offense was committed as 1) a juvenile, 2) an incest offense, or 3) an offense where the victim consented but was underage (e.g. statutory rape). The law also provides for an override that would allow the inclusion on the Internet Registry of a Tier 2 offender who falls under one of the above three exceptions where the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that the risk posed to the general public posed by the offender is substantially similar to that posed by offenders whose risk of re-offense is moderate.

 

The particular information contained on the Internet Registry is similar but not identical to the information provided in the community notification flyers distributed to those "likely to encounter" an offender. The information currently provided under the Internet Registry includes: the offender's name and any aliases used by the offender; any Megan's Law sex offenses committed by the offender, including a brief description and the date and location of disposition of any such offense; a general description of the offender's modus operandi, if any; the determination of whether the risk of re-offense by the offender is moderate or high; the offender's age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, hair, eye color and any distinguishing scars or tattoos; a photograph of the offender and the date on which the photograph was entered into the registry; the make, model, color, year and license plate number of any vehicle operated by the offender; and the county in which the offender resides. The Internet Registry information does not include an offender's street address, zip code, or municipality as the result of an injunction obtained by the Public Defender's Office. In addition the Internet Registry does not include information about an offender's place of employment or schooling which is contained in the State's notification system provided to those "likely to encounter" the offender.

 

Bloomingdale (07403) Clifton (07011) Green Pond (07435)Greenwood Lake (07421) Haledon (07538) Haskell (07420) Hawthorne (07506) Hawthorne (07507) Hewitt (07421) Hillcrest (07502) Jefferson Township (07438) Jefferson Twp (07438) Little Falls (07424) Midvale (07465) Mountain View (07470) North Haledon (07508) North Haledon (07538) Oak Ridge (07438) Pompton Lakes (07442) Preakness (07470) Prospect Park (07508) Prospect Pk (07508) Ringwood (07456) Shady Lake (07480) Totowa (07502) Totowa (07511) Totowa Boro (07512) Upper Greenwood Lake (07421) W Paterson (07424) Wanaque (07465) Wayne (07470) Wayne (07474) West Milford (07480) West Milford Lakes (07480) West Paterson (07424) Woodland Park (07424) Allendale (07401) Alpine (07620) Bergenfield (07621) Bogota (07603) Carlstadt (07072) Cliff Park (07010) Cliffside Park (07010) Cliffside Pk (07010) Closter (07624) Cresskill (07626) Darlington (07446) Demarest (07627) Dumont (07628) E Rutherford (07073) East Rutherford (07073) Edgewater (07020) Elmwood Park (07407) Emerson (07630) Englewd Clfs (07632) Englewood (07631) Englewood (07632) Englewood Cliffs (07632) Fair Lawn (07410) Fairlawn (07410) Fairview (07022) Fort Lee (07024) Franklin Lakes (07417) Franklin Lks (07417) Garfield (07026) Glen Rock (07452) Hack (07601) Hackensack (07601) Harrington Pk (07640) Hasbrouck Heights (07604) Hasbrouck Hts (07604) Haworth (07641) Hillsdale (07642) Hillsdale (07676) Ho Ho Kus (07423) Leonia (07605) Little Ferry (07643) Lodi (07644) Lyndhurst (07071) Mahwah (07430) Mahwah (07495) Maywood (07607) Midland Park (07432) Midland Pk (07432) Montvale (07645) Moonachie (07074) Morsemere (07657) N Arlington (07031) N Milford (07646) New Milford (07646) (07699) North Arlington (07031) Palisades Park (07650) Palisades Pk (07650) Paramus (07652) Paramus (07653) Park Ridge (07656) Radburn (07410) Ramsey (07446) Ridgefield (07657) Ridgefield Park (07660) Ridgefield Pk (07660) Ridgewood River Edge (07661)Rochelle Park (07662) Rockleigh (07647) Rutherford (07070) S Hackensack (07606) Saddle Brook (07663) Saddle River (07458) South Hackensack (07606) Teaneck (07666) Tenafly (07670) Teterboro (07608) Teterboro (07699) (07463) Wallington (07057) Westwood (07677) Wood Ridge (07075) Wood-Ridge (07075) Wyckoff (07481) Arlington (07032) Bayonne (07002)Bergenline (07087) East Newark (07029) Guttenberg (07093) Harrison (07029) Hoboken (07030) Jersey City (07097) Kearny (07032) North Bergen (07047) Union City (07087) Washington Street (07030) Weehawken (07087) West Arlington (07032) West New York (07093) Woodcliff (07047) Montclair (07043) N Caldwell (07006) Newark (07106) Newark (07107) Newark (07108) Newark (07114) Newark (07175) Bloomfield Belleville Irvington (07111)

 

259 Union Street Hackensack, New Jersey 07601

Phone: (201) 646-9799 | Fax: (201) 646-9476 | Email: gomez@gomezlegal.com

 

Bergen County Megan's Law Criminal Defense Lawyers | Attorneys

 

Hi, this is Michael and this is my wife Gene Blissoffer. I just wanted to let you know that we had a great experience with my lawyer Rafael Gomez, everything he said that would uh work out did, uh we haven't had any bumps in the road at all due with this case from the beginning, he seemed that everything would work out, he told us everything would work out and it did and I appreciate it and if you get a chance if you have to use Rafael Gomez. Thank you.

-------------------------------------

Plaintiff appeals from two orders: an April 30, 2018 order dismissing the amended complaint against defendant Caliber Home Loans (Caliber); and a June 8, 2018 order dismissing the complaint against defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase), improperly pled as J.P. Morgan Chase. Judge Margaret Goodzeit entered the orders and rendered comprehensive and thorough opinions. We affirm.

 

Almost eleven years ago, a bank instituted a residential foreclosure complaint against plaintiff, who immediately filed an answer contesting the bank's allegations. In November 2009, the bank obtained final judgment, which the court amended. The Sheriff then scheduled the sale of the property. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 petition, which stayed the sale. The bankruptcy court dismissed the petition in October 2016, and although the Sheriff re-listed the sale, plaintiff stayed it again by filing a Chapter 7 petition. The bankruptcy court lifted the stay, refusing to stay the sale any further, despite multiple applications by plaintiff.[1] Plaintiff filed this complaint in January 2018, and the Sheriff sale of the property occurred in June 2018.

 

In this complaint, plaintiff alleged she proposed to redeem the property in March 2010, Chase failed to respond, Caliber became the servicer of the loan in July 2015, and Caliber provided a pay-off figure to plaintiff in November 2017. The judge entered the orders under review dismissing the complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e), the entire controversy doctrine (ECD), res judicata, and collateral estoppel.

 

On appeal, plaintiff argues the judge erred by dismissing the complaint by relying on the ECD. Indeed, her merits brief focuses solely on the ECD, although at oral argument before us, she contended that the judge erroneously relied on the other bases for dismissing this case. Plaintiff urges us to reverse the orders and award her damages.

 

We conclude that plaintiff's contentions are without sufficient merit to warrant attention in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We reach that conclusion even considering plaintiff's new arguments on appeal, on the record that she expanded without court order. We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Goodzeit.

 

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madridiario

 

15-06-2009

José y Emilio son dos hermanos madrileños que un día, tras el cierre de la célebre tienda de discos Madrid Rock, decidieron quedarse en esa esquina de la Gran Vía para reivindicar que Madrid es mucho más "que un 'tiendódromo' y curro-casa, casa-curro".

Todos los días a partir de las siete de la tarde José y Emilio Alcázar se acercan hasta su esquina de la Gran Vía, junto al semáforo que está frente al Bershka. Antes en este local estaba Madrid Rock. Ellos eran habituales y cuando se enteraron de que querían despedir a los trabajadores, sus "colegas", sin indemnización hicieron campaña con ellos. A partir de ese momento, en 2005, decidieron quedarse ahí.

 

"La calle es un sitio habitable, es como un garito", afirma Emilio, que se distingue por el turbante que lleva en el pelo. Además, "mola este sitio porque está lleno de 'pibas' guapas todo el día", asegura su hermano gemelo. Al principio, las autoridades les quisieron echar. "Después se dieron cuenta de que ni bebes ni fumas ni te metes con nadie y te acaban tolerando. Bueno, depende, porque todo el mundo tiene su destino y, si fuese nuestro destino, ya nos hubiesen echado", reflexiona José.

 

Por el momento, continúan en la Gran Vía, viendo a la gente pasar y retratándose con todo el que se lo pide. La gente se les acerca, les preguntan que qué hacen continuamente, les dan chapas. También hay quienes les miran de reojo. Ellos se llevan especialmente bien con los "barrendas" y las prostitutas, que "son muy majas".

 

—¿A qué os dedicáis?

—Mi dedicación es vivir, ser un ser humano con mayúscula. Mi curro es no servir a algo que me parece injusto: un primer mundo que necesita un segundo y un tercero. El 'carpe diem' da vértigo porque el futuro es donde anida el miedo que el sistema quiere que tengas. Esa hipoteca mental es su fuerza y tú una especie de fausto que vende su alma por cuatro baratijas— contesta de un tirón Emilio.

 

Presumen de vivir despegados de la vida material. "No tener móvil, no tener trabajo, no tener cuenta corriente, no tener coche es dificilísimo porque siempre te están bombardeando con lo mismo, pero si tienes un ideal verdadero debes pelear por él", dice José, que incluso mete cizaña a su hermano por tener teléfono. "Se le cayó a una guiri", se disculpa.

 

—¿Cuál es el secreto para poder vivir sin trabajar?

—El secreto es descubrirte a ti mismo— responde el gemelo del turbante.

 

No dan muchas más pistas: viven en un pequeño piso en Tetuán y aprovechan la comida que los supermercados tiran, pero sí un consejo: "Cuando crees que lo importante de la obra de teatro es el decorado, la has 'cagao'. Lo importante es el guión y lo escribes tú cada segundo de la vida".

 

Tienen 43 años cada uno. "86 años de rock and roll. ¿Qué pasa?", bromea Emilio. Empezaron a escuchar heavy bien pronto en el "colegio de curas" al que fueron : "Vimos que el lenguaje en el que expresaba tu verdadero ser era el rock, no el 'Padre Nuestro'", relata José.

 

Después llegaron los ochenta y los excesos. "Fue demoledor. Murió mucha gente". Incluso un hermano de los Alcázar falleció por sobredosis, según aseguran. "Ellos han muerto para que nosotros tengamos una vida mejor", afirma José, que al igual que su hermano lleva años sin beber ni consumir ningún tipo de drogas, al margen de la Coca-Cola.

 

Creen que todos los políticos son iguales, aunque unos más burgueses que otros: "La política es el empleo del que mejor engaña", según la definición de Emilio. No les gusta posicionarse sobre estos temas porque "separan a la gente", pero hay algo que se les ha quedado grabado. "Nunca olvidaré cómo llegó Aguirre a la Comunidad, fue un golpe de estado", dice.

 

Los heavies de la Gran Vía se sienten orgullosos de ser de Madrid, "que se convirtió en un símbolo durante la Guerra Civil porque fue la primera ciudad donde se paró el fascismo". También por el carácter de la gente: "No es que seamos chulos es que entendemos bien la vida", dice José con el peculiar acento de chulapo con el que hablan estos hermanos criados en Chamberí

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

15-06-09-Carmen M. Gutiérrez - Joseph and Emilio are two brothers Madrid that one day, after the closure of the famous disks Madrid rock shop, decided to stay in this corner of the Gran Vía to claim that Madrid is much more "than a 'tiendódromo' curro-casa, casa-curro".

All the days of the seven of the late Joseph and Emilio Alcázar move closer to its corner of Gran Vía, alongside the lights are facing the Bershka. Earlier in this place was Madrid rock. They were common and when heard that wanted to dismiss workers, his colleagues, without compensation made campaign with them. From that time, in 2005, decided to stay there.

 

The street is a livable site, is like a garito, says Emilio, distinguished by the turban in hair. Hydatidiform this site because all day is full of 'pibas' guapas, in addition, says his twin brother. At the beginning, authorities wanted them to lend. "Then they realized that baby fumas nor you crawl with anyone and you just tolerated." Well, depends on, because everyone has their destiny and if our destiny, as us had kicked, reflects José.

 

At the moment, continue in the Gran Vía, seeing people pass and retratándo_ is all that it requires. The people is approaching them, I ask that what they do constantly give veneers. There are who they look of reojo. They are especially well with the barrendas and prostitutes, "are very majas".

 

-Do what you dedicáis?

-My dedication is live, be a human being with capital. My curro is to serve something which seems unfair to me: a first world needing a second and third parties. The 'carpe diem' da Vertigo because the future is where lies the fear that the system wants to have. That mental mortgage is its strength and a kind of marking sold his soul by four baratijas - answer of a pull Emilio.

 

Presume live detached of material life. "Not have mobile, no work, have no current account, not having car is me because you are always bombing with the same, but if you have a real ideal must fight for him," says Joseph, makes it that even number tares his brother by phone. "Are you fell to a guiri", you'll excuse.

 

-What is the secret to be able to live without work?

-The secret is discovered you yourself - responding the twin of the turban.

 

Do not give many more tracks: live in a small Tétouan floor and take advantage of the food supermarkets thrown, but a tip: "when you think that the work of theatre importantly the décor, it has 'cagao'." "It is the script and it writing you every second of life".

 

Have 43 years each. "86 years of rock and roll." Do what is happening? ", is Emilio." Began to hear heavy well soon cures school which were: "we saw be the language in which it expressed your true was the rock, not the 'father our'", tells José.

 

Then came the eighties and excesses. "It was demolition". He died people. Even a brother of the Citadel died from overdose, according to ensure. "They died so we have a life better", says Joseph, that as his brother takes years without drink or eat any type of drugs, out of Coca-Cola.

 

Believe that all politicians are equal, although some more bourgeoiss than others: policy is employment than better misled, as defined by Emilio. Don't like position on these issues because separate people, but there is something to them has been recorded. I will never forget how Aguirre reached the community, was a coup d ' état, says.

 

The Gran Vía heavies are proud to be in Madrid, "became a symbol during the civil war because it was the first city where stood fascism". Also by the character of the people: "is not we chulos is we well understand life", says José peculiar accent that speak these brethren bred Chamberí chulapo

Porque Juan Carlos, mi vecino el del 3º B, ha dejado su depresión de lado hoy, a causa de no poder pagar la hipoteca que le llega el Martes.

 

Porque mi padre, nunca me llama por teléfono, y hoy lo ha hecho emocionado, cuando ha acabado el partido.

 

Porque Iker Casillas y Sara Carbonero sólo son dos chicos que se quieren, y dos profesionales como la copa de un pino.

 

Porque Salva, un tio de derechas, y Oscar, un socialista empedernido, se han fundido en un abrazo infinito.

 

Porque hemos gritado Visca España, Gora España, y Puxa España.

 

Porque me alegro de no ser perfecto, y ser un amante incondicional de este deporte.

 

Porque hoy, en España, no hay crisis, y mañana ... mañana Dios dirá ...

 

Porque la selección española de fútbol, mi selección, ha ganado la Copa del Mundo, y hoy, todos hemos sido uno. Y disculpen mi fanatismo por este deporte, pero hoy, los problemas son menos.

 

Gracias España, gracias África.

   

ENGLISH

   

Because Juan Carlos, my neighbor on the 3rd B, depression has left his side today, because you can not pay the mortgage that arrives on Tuesday.

 

Because my father never calls me, and today it has moved, when finished the game.

 

Because Salva, a guy on the right politic, and Oscar, a hardened socialist, have fused in an embrace infinity.

 

Because we shouted Visca Spain, Gora Spain and Puxa Spain.

 

Because I am glad not be perfect, and be an unconditional lover of the sport.

 

Because today, in Spain, there is no crisis, and tomorrow ... God will say tomorrow ...

 

Because the Spanish football team, my selection has won the World Cup, and today, we are all one. And sorry my fanaticism for the sport, but today, the problems are less.

 

Thanks Spain, thanks Africa.

  

Nikon D3

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© Manuel Orero

www.orerofotografia.com

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Buenas tardes estoy en la oficina de Rafael Gómez, viene por un caso de bancarrota, es super bien, se lo recomiendo.

---------------------------------

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La oficina legal del Abogado de Bancarrota de Nueva Jersey del Sr. R. Gómez, Abogado tiene su oficina principal ubicada en Hackensack, Nueva Jersey 07601.

 

​Esta Oficina de Abogados de Bancarrota del Condado de Bergen ha ayudado a miles de clientes con problemas de deuda, embargos de automóviles, hipotecas embargadas, recargos de comisiones de vehículos motorizados (DMV), demandas, embargos salariales e innumerables problemas de deuda que generalmente se resuelven presentando un caso de bancarrota, en el Tribunales de quiebras.

 

Ruta Route 80, 4, 46, 17, 3, 21, 20, 7, NJ Turnpike, Garden State Parkway, George Washington Bridge, Lincoln Tunnel, Ruta Route 1 & 9, Bergenline Avenue, Kennedy Boulevard, Boulevard East

 

PASSAIC COUNTY & BERGEN COUNTY & HUDSON COUNTY & Some ESSEX

Bloomingdale(07403) Clifton(07011) Green Pond(07435) Greenwood Lake(07421) Haledon(07538) Haskell(07420) Hawthorne(07506) Hawthorne(07507) Hewitt(07421) Hillcrest(07502) Jefferson Township(07438) Jefferson Twp(07438) Little Falls(07424) Midvale(07465) Mountain View(07470) North Haledon(07508) North Haledon(07538) Oak Ridge(07438) Pompton Lakes(07442) Preakness(07470) Prospect Park(07508) Prospect Pk(07508) Ringwood(07456) Shady Lake(07480) Totowa(07502) Totowa(07511) Totowa Boro(07512) Upper Greenwood Lake(07421) W Paterson(07424) Wanaque(07465) Wayne(07470) Wayne(07474) West Milford(07480) West Milford Lakes(07480) West Paterson(07424) Woodland Park(07424) Allendale(07401) Alpine(07620) Bergenfield(07621) Bogota(07603) Carlstadt(07072) Cliff Park(07010) Cliffside Park(07010) Cliffside Pk(07010) Closter(07624) Cresskill(07626) Darlington(07446) Demarest(07627) Dumont(07628) E Rutherford(07073) East Rutherford(07073) Edgewater(07020) Elmwood Park(07407) Emerson(07630) Englewd Clfs(07632) Englewood(07631) Englewood(07632) Englewood Cliffs(07632) Fair Lawn(07410) Fairlawn(07410) Fairview(07022) Fort Lee(07024) Franklin Lakes(07417) Franklin Lks(07417) Garfield(07026) Glen Rock(07452) Hack(07601) Hackensack(07601) Harrington Pk(07640) Hasbrouck Heights(07604) Hasbrouck Hts(07604) Haworth(07641) Hillsdale(07642) Hillsdale(07676) Ho Ho Kus(07423) Leonia(07605) Little Ferry(07643) Lodi(07644) Lyndhurst(07071) Mahwah(07430) Mahwah(07495) Maywood(07607) Midland Park(07432) Midland Pk(07432) Montvale(07645) Moonachie(07074) Morsemere(07657) N Arlington(07031) N Milford(07646) New Milford(07646) North Arlington(07031) Palisades Park(07650) Palisades Pk(07650) Paramus(07652) Paramus(07653) Park Ridge(07656) Radburn(07410) Ramsey(07446) Ridgefield(07657) Ridgefield Park(07660) Ridgefield Pk(07660) River Edge(07661) Rochelle Park(07662) Rockleigh(07647) Rutherford(07070) S Hackensack(07606) Saddle Brook(07663) Saddle River(07458) South Hackensack(07606) Teaneck(07666) Tenafly(07670) Teterboro(07608) Teterboro(07699) Wallington(07057) Westwood(07677) Wood Ridge(07075) Wood-Ridge(07075) Wyckoff(07481) Arlington(07032) Bayonne(07002) Bergenline(07087) East Newark(07029) Guttenberg(07093) Harrison(07029) Hoboken(07030) Jersey City(07097) Kearny(07032) North Bergen(07047) Union City(07087)

 

JUICIO HIPOTECARIO

 

(201) 646-3333

ABOGADO DE BANCARROTA DEL CONDADO DE BERGEN

 

Hoy en día, muchos propietarios de viviendas de Nueva Jersey que viven en Bergen, Hudson o el condado de Passaic se enfrentan a la crisis de perder sus hogares. Más personas se preguntan cómo afectará la ejecución hipotecaria a su crédito. La respuesta a esa pregunta es: afectará su crédito muy negativamente junto con una serie de otras ramificaciones financieras. Si el proceso de ejecución hipotecaria comienza en su hogar, no podrá solicitar ningún tipo de préstamo por dos años completos. Esto incluye cualquier tipo de financiación, por pequeña que sea.

My name is Marco Santucci. Rafael Gomez representing me just now, he did a really great job. I thought I was going to lose my license today and he amended my charges and he brought belief to me when I thought I had none. So I thank him.

 

The essential facts are undisputed. Blasucci and his wife took title to the residential property in 1976. The Blasuccis gave a first mortgage to First Fidelity Bank in 1986 and a second mortgage to Washington Savings Bank in 1987. Washington Savings instituted a foreclosure action against the Blasuccis in May 1990 and obtained final judgment of foreclosure the following October. First Fidelity and Washington Savings subsequently assigned their mortgages to Martin Tave and the Sylvia T. Cohen Revocable Trust (Tave and Cohen). The property was sold at sheriff's sale in June 1994 to Tave and Cohen, who took subject to the First Fidelity mortgage which they held and subsequently discharged. Tave and Cohen conveyed the property to Gourkanti in October 1997.

 

Siegel did not obtain his default judgment against Blasucci until July 1992, almost two years after the entry of the foreclosure judgment. Siegel claims that his judgment, docketed in July 1992 and revived in November 2011, was a lien against Blasucci's real property that was not extinguished by the

 

October 1990 foreclosure judgment and subsequent sheriff's sale. He contends that either Washington Savings or Tave and Cohen was required to amend the foreclosure complaint to include him as a subsequent encumbrancer in order to bind him to the foreclosure judgment. We disagree.

 

We addressed this issue in Morsemere Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Nicolaou, 206 N.J. Super. 637 (App. Div. 1986). Morsemere, a foreclosing mortgagee, obtained final judgment of foreclosure against Nicolaou. Id. at 640-41. After entry of the foreclosure judgment, DiPrima obtained a default judgment against Nicolaou. Id. at 641. DiPrima subsequently purchased the property at sheriff's sale. DiPrima then filed a motion to intervene in the foreclosure action and for payment of surplus funds. Ibid.

 

We held that a lien claimant such as DiPrima cannot be made a party to a foreclosure suit after entry of final judgment. Morsemere, supra, 206 N.J. Super. at 641-42. We reasoned that N.J.S.A. 2A:50-30, which operates to bind the holders of unrecorded interests existing at the filing of the foreclosure to the judgment and allows those holding such interests to intervene as of right upon recording, did not apply "because DiPrima's lien did not exist `at the time of the filing of the complaint' or even at the time the foreclosure judgment was entered." Ibid. Instead, we held that N.J.S.A. 2A:50-37 was controlling, and thus a creditor who obtains a money judgment subsequent to entry of the foreclosure judgment "may participate in any surplus after prior claiming lienholders (at the time of the foreclosure judgment) have been paid or satisfied." Morsemere, supra, 206 N.J. Super. at 642-43.

 

Un promotor inmobiliario de esas casas con paredes de cartón...

A developer of those houses with walls of cardboard ...

 

Hi my name is Habib Montoya, I've been using Rafael like as a lawyer in different cases and everything is being weekly and easy.

-------------------------------------------------------

Defendant Christina Gaskins appeals from a Family Part order, entered on October 23, 2015, denying her motion to vacate prior orders entered on December 20, 2013, January 24, 2014, and December 19, 2014. She argues that in the December 20, 2013 order, the trial judge erroneously assumed jurisdiction to modify the existing custody order, and, in the January 24, 2014 order, erroneously concluded she had violated the December 2013 order. Defendant also argues that during the prior proceedings, "the tone of the [j]udge's admonishments[] and his summary decisions [gave] rise to a distinct appearance of impropriety and partiality," thereby justifying a change of venue. Additionally, defendant argues that the judge violated her rights under the Service Members Civil Relief Act (SCRA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901 to 4043, by denying her application for a stay of the proceedings. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss defendant's appeal as untimely.

 

We glean the following pertinent facts from the record. Defendant and plaintiff Charles Walker divorced in December 2009, when a Florida court entered a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage. Pursuant to the divorce judgment, defendant had sole custody of the couple's four children, with plaintiff having parenting time in the summer, and plaintiff was ordered to pay defendant child support, collected via wage garnishment.

 

In March 2010, defendant and the children moved to Texas, and, at some point, plaintiff moved to New Jersey. Plaintiff continued to exercise parenting time, and in July 2013, the children were residing with him in Millville, New Jersey, for their summer visitation. In September 2013, plaintiff filed a motion to domesticate the Florida custody and child support order in New Jersey. In his accompanying certification, plaintiff averred that "[d]uring summer visitation, [defendant] . . . stated she wanted the children to remain in New Jersey with [him]" because "she needed to get herself together." As a result, according to plaintiff, "[defendant] came to New Jersey and registered [the] children at Millville Public Schools." Plaintiff provided a letter to the court, purportedly written by defendant on July 23, 2013, in which she confirmed that the children would be living with plaintiff "for school purposes."

 

Plaintiff further certified that while the children were residing with him, defendant had refused to return the child support she was still receiving from him under the Florida child support order. Plaintiff asked the court to stop child support payments to defendant and order defendant to pay him child support. In response, on October 10, 2013, defendant sent a letter to the court claiming she had received late notice of the hearing on plaintiff's motion scheduled for October 25, 2013, and requesting a postponement "to seek counsel." Defendant objected to "mov[ing] jurisdiction," because Texas "ha[d] been [the children's] home for almost [four] years." Defendant said she had only intended for the children to stay with plaintiff during that school year, and they would return to live with her "in Houston, Texas after [she] finish[ed] . . . officer training with the Army Officer Commissioning School th[at] summer."

 

Hola, soy Fernando y he usado el abogado Rafael Gómez para varios casos y es un muy buen abogado. Se los recomiendo.

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El demandante y el demandado se casaron el 21 de junio de 1987 y tuvieron un hijo. La pareja se divorció el 8 de marzo de 2011, celebrando un acuerdo de propiedad y manutención (el acuerdo). El acuerdo obliga al demandante a pagar al demandado $ 42,500 por año en pensión alimenticia permanente en cuotas iguales de $ 817.31 por semana. El acuerdo establece que el demandante tenía cincuenta y dos años en el momento del divorcio y trabajaba como chef ejecutivo en la ciudad de Nueva York, ganando un salario de $ 180,400 por año. También tenía un plan de ahorro 401K a través de su empleador y un Acuerdo de Jubilación Individual (IRA). El acusado había trabajado como secretaria, ganando $ 20,800 al año, pero estaba desempleado en el momento del divorcio. Ella también tenía una IRA. Las partes acordaron una división equitativa en partes iguales de las porciones matrimoniales de las diversas cuentas de jubilación y otras cuentas.

 

En marzo de 2015, el demandante perdió su trabajo. En junio de 2015 dejó de pagar su pensión alimenticia. El demandado se movió para hacer cumplir los derechos del litigante en julio de 2015. El demandante hizo una movida cruzada buscando terminar su obligación de pensión alimenticia, revisar su obligación de pensión alimenticia al obtener empleo y emancipar al hijo de las partes.

 

El 30 de septiembre de 2015, el juez de Family Part determinó que el desempleo del demandante era de naturaleza temporal, negó la modificación y emitió una orden que requería que el demandante pagara al demandado $ 11,442.34 en atrasos de pensión alimenticia y $ 2100 en atrasos de manutención de menores dentro de catorce días y que reanudara los pagos regulares. El juez de Family Part también negó la emancipación del hijo de las partes.

 

El 9 de octubre de 2015, el demandante solicitó la reconsideración de la orden del 30 de septiembre de 2015. En octubre de 2015, el demandante obtuvo un nuevo puesto ganando $ 114,000 por año. El 2 de diciembre de 2015, el juez de Family Part emitió una orden otorgando la moción de reconsideración del demandante en parte, concediendo la solicitud del demandante de emancipación del hijo de las partes, denegando la solicitud del demandante de modificación de la pensión alimenticia y denegando las solicitudes de honorarios de abogados de ambas partes. El juez de Family Part desacreditó la discrepancia en los ingresos entre el puesto anterior del demandante y su nuevo puesto, señalando que el costo de vida en Florida, donde reside el demandante, es más bajo que en Nueva Jersey / Nueva York, y el salario anual de $ 114,000 del demandante no estaba en y por sí misma prueba prima facie de que no pudo ganar lo que ganaba anteriormente para establecer un cambio de circunstancias.

 

El acusado no recibió pagos de pensión alimenticia del demandante y presentó otra moción el 8 de diciembre de 2015, buscando el embargo de salario y el control de la libertad condicional. El demandante volvió a solicitar la modificación de la pensión alimenticia. El 22 de marzo de 2016, el juez de Family Part concedió la solicitud del demandado de embargo de salario y control de libertad condicional y ordenó al demandante que hiciera un pago global de $ 11,442.34 dentro de los treinta días. El demandante apeló la orden del 22 de marzo de 2016. En la apelación, el demandante argumenta que el tribunal cometió un error al negar la modificación de la pensión alimenticia y solicita que el asunto se devuelva a un juez diferente; El demandante también sostiene que debería recibir honorarios de abogado. No estamos de acuerdo y afirmamos.

 

La revisión en apelación es particularmente respetuosa con las conclusiones de hecho de los tribunales de familia debido a su experiencia única. Cesare contra Cesare, 154 N.J.394, 413 (1998).

Hi my name is Kevin Brown I am an attorney, I've been practicing since the early 90s. I've known Mr Gomez for over 10 years. I used to be a municipal prosecutor and that's where I first met him. I could say with the utmost conviction that he cares about his clients and that if you choose him to represent you he will defend your interest vigorously. I know you hear this all the time and you get a lot of attorneys promising things but Rafael he's one of the conscientious ones and he will do his best for you not only do his best but he's a very knowledgeable attorney.

---------------------------------

CHAPTER 7 ARTICLE - BANKRUPTCY ATTORNEY IN HUDSON COUNTY NEW JERSEY (201) 646-3333

  

JOAN MARIE HOFFMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

J.P. MORGAN CHASE and CALIBER HOME LOANS, Defendants-Respondents.

No. A-4566-17T4.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

 

Argued telephonically May 13, 2019.

Decided June 5, 2019.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Somerset County, Docket No. C-012005-18.

 

Joan Marie Hoffman, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

 

Robert T. Yusko argued the cause for respondent Caliber Home Loans (Perkins Coie LLP, attorneys; Robert T. Yusko, on the brief).

 

Eva K. Carey argued the cause for respondent J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (Bertone Piccini, LLP, attorneys; Eva K. Carey, of counsel and on the brief).

 

Before Judges Fasciale and Rose.

 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

 

PER CURIAM.

 

Plaintiff appeals from two orders: an April 30, 2018 order dismissing the amended complaint against defendant Caliber Home Loans (Caliber); and a June 8, 2018 order dismissing the complaint against defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase), improperly pled as J.P. Morgan Chase. Judge Margaret Goodzeit entered the orders and rendered comprehensive and thorough opinions. We affirm.

 

Almost eleven years ago, a bank instituted a residential foreclosure complaint against plaintiff, who immediately filed an answer contesting the bank's allegations. In November 2009, the bank obtained final judgment, which the court amended. The Sheriff then scheduled the sale of the property. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 petition, which stayed the sale. The bankruptcy court dismissed the petition in October 2016, and although the Sheriff re-listed the sale, plaintiff stayed it again by filing a Chapter 7 petition. The bankruptcy court lifted the stay, refusing to stay the sale any further, despite multiple applications by plaintiff.[1] Plaintiff filed this complaint in January 2018, and the Sheriff sale of the property occurred in June 2018.

 

In this complaint, plaintiff alleged she proposed to redeem the property in March 2010, Chase failed to respond, Caliber became the servicer of the loan in July 2015, and Caliber provided a pay-off figure to plaintiff in November 2017. The judge entered the orders under review dismissing the complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e), the entire controversy doctrine (ECD), res judicata, and collateral estoppel.

 

On appeal, plaintiff argues the judge erred by dismissing the complaint by relying on the ECD. Indeed, her merits brief focuses solely on the ECD, although at oral argument before us, she contended that the judge erroneously relied on the other bases for dismissing this case. Plaintiff urges us to reverse the orders and award her damages.

 

We conclude that plaintiff's contentions are without sufficient merit to warrant attention in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We reach that conclusion even considering plaintiff's new arguments on appeal, on the record that she expanded without court order. We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Goodzeit.

 

Affirmed

 

[1] Plaintiff filed at least three other bankruptcy petitions, seeking further stays of the sale. The bankruptcy court dismissed the petitions and denied each of her requests to stay the sale of the property.

ARTÍCULO DE BANCARROTA

ABOGADO EN NUEVA JERSEY (201) 646-3333

 

SANDRA STEUDTNER, Demandante-Apelante,v.PATRICIA PECORARO, Demandada-Demandada.

No. A-4262-11T1.

Tribunal Superior de Nueva Jersey, División de Apelaciones.

Entregado el 9 de enero de 2013.Decidido el 8 de agosto de 2013.

 

Brian R. Quentzel, abogado del apelante.

 

John W. Sywilok, abogado del demandado.

 

Ante los jueces Nugent y Haas.

 

NO PARA PUBLICACIÓN SIN LA APROBACIÓN DE LA DIVISIÓN DE APELADOS

 

POR CURIAM.

 

La demandante Sandra Steudtner apela de la denegación de su moción de reconsideración de la orden de un juez de la División de Derecho que canceló y descargó su gravamen de sentencia contra la residencia de la acusada Patricia Pecoraro bajo N.J.S.A. 2A: 16-49,1. Ese estatuto autoriza la cancelación y descarga de un gravamen de sentencia que fue descargado o descargado en un procedimiento de quiebra. El juez de la División de Derecho había determinado anteriormente que la disputa de las partes sobre si el gravamen de la sentencia era liberable en el procedimiento de quiebra del demandado debería haber sido abordado por el demandante durante ese procedimiento. Cuando el juez tomó esa determinación, no pudo apreciar la importancia de la evidencia del demandante de que el gravamen de la sentencia no se había descargado, y no se podía descargar, durante el procedimiento de quiebra. En consecuencia, la moción de reconsideración del demandante debería haberse concedido. Invertimos el orden negando ese movimiento.

 

Las partes no discuten los hechos. El demandante demandó al demandado en la Parte Civil Especial por incumplimiento de contrato y las partes llegaron a un acuerdo. El demandado violó el acuerdo de conciliación y en enero de 2007 [1] el demandante obtuvo una sentencia por la cantidad de $ 13,132 contra el demandado. Más de dos años después, el 17 de noviembre de 2009, el demandante registró la sentencia [2].

 

El 2 de marzo de 2010, el tribunal emitió una orden de ejecución, que un oficial del alguacil entregó al demandado el 17 de mayo de 2010. El mes siguiente, el 24 de junio de 2010, el demandado presentó una petición de quiebra bajo el Capítulo 7 de la Ley de Quiebras de los Estados Unidos. Code, que incluye al demandante como acreedor en el "Anexo F, Acreedores que tienen reclamaciones no prioritarias no garantizadas".

 

Aunque la demandada solicitó al Tribunal de Quiebras que saldara su deuda con el demandante, no solicitó al tribunal que cancelara el gravamen de la sentencia sobre su residencia. Más bien, en el "Anexo A - Bienes inmuebles" de la petición, afirmó que el valor de su casa era $ 399,900 y que debía un saldo hipotecario de $ 344,734.35, dejando $ 55,165.65 en equidad. Contra esa equidad, el demandado reclamó una exención de $ 21,625 bajo 11 U.S.C.A. Sección 522 (d) (1). Por lo tanto, con base en la información proporcionada por la demandada en su petición de quiebra, tenía $ 33,540.65 en equidad en su casa no sujeta a exenciones; más del doble del gravamen del juicio del demandante de $ 13,132.

 

En septiembre de 2010, el fiduciario de la quiebra presentó un "Informe de No Distribución", en el que informó "que no hay propiedad disponible para distribución de la herencia por encima de la exenta por ley". El 18 de enero de 2011, el juez de quiebras emitió una orden de descargo del acusado. [3]

 

Un año después, en enero de 2012, el demandante presentó una moción en la División de Derecho para "mantener el status quo". Ella buscó que el tribunal extendiera indefinidamente la orden de ejecución y ordenara al alguacil que no devolviera la orden. La demandante apoyó su moción con la certificación de su abogado, que relataba la entrada del fallo, sus intentos de cobrar el fallo de la personalidad del acusado, la obstrucción del acusado de ese proceso y el impuesto del alguacil sobre la residencia del acusado. El abogado afirmó que el descargo del demandado en quiebra impidió al demandante perseguir la responsabilidad personal contra el demandado, y que "el [p] demandante ahora se limita a los bienes inmuebles, sobre los cuales se recaudó antes del inicio de la bancarrota del Capítulo 7 del [d] demandado caso." Explicando que el auto que había obtenido antes de que el demandado se declarara en quiebra estaba programado para ser devuelto en marzo de 2012, dos años después de la fecha de su emisión, la demandante trató de mantener el status quo "extendiendo la vida del auto de ejecución sujeto y continuo [ ing] su gravamen sobre la propiedad en cuestión [.] "

 

En respuesta a la moción del demandante, el demandado presentó una contra moción para que la corte anule y cancele la sentencia bajo N.J.S.A. 2A: 16-49.1, que establece en la parte pertinente:

Hola como estan, buenas tardes yo soy Nancy Gómez, estoy aquí donde el abogado Rafael Gómez, se lo recomiendo, estoy muy feliz con su ayuda, entonces vengan aquí que aquí van a estar bien atendidos y van a salir muy satisfechos.

---------------------------------------------------

Ruta Route 80, 4, 46, 17, 3, 21, 20, 7, NJ Turnpike, Garden State Parkway, George Washington Bridge, Lincoln Tunnel, Ruta Route 1 & 9, Bergenline Avenue, Kennedy Boulevard, Boulevard East

 

PASSAIC COUNTY & BERGEN COUNTY & HUDSON COUNTY & Some ESSEX

Bloomingdale(07403) Clifton(07011) Green Pond(07435) Greenwood Lake(07421) Haledon(07538) Haskell(07420) Hawthorne(07506) Hawthorne(07507) Hewitt(07421) Hillcrest(07502) Jefferson Township(07438) Jefferson Twp(07438) Little Falls(07424) Midvale(07465) Mountain View(07470) North Haledon(07508) North Haledon(07538) Oak Ridge(07438) Pompton Lakes(07442) Preakness(07470) Prospect Park(07508) Prospect Pk(07508) Ringwood(07456) Shady Lake(07480) Totowa(07502) Totowa(07511) Totowa Boro(07512) Upper Greenwood Lake(07421) W Paterson(07424) Wanaque(07465) Wayne(07470) Wayne(07474) West Milford(07480) West Milford Lakes(07480) West Paterson(07424) Woodland Park(07424) Allendale(07401) Alpine(07620) Bergenfield(07621) Bogota(07603)Carlstadt(07072) Cliff Park(07010) Cliffside Park(07010) Cliffside Pk(07010) Closter(07624) Cresskill(07626) Darlington(07446) Demarest(07627) Dumont(07628) E Rutherford(07073) East Rutherford(07073) Edgewater(07020) Elmwood Park(07407) Emerson(07630) Englewd Clfs(07632) Englewood(07631) Englewood(07632) Englewood Cliffs(07632) Fair Lawn(07410) Fairlawn(07410) Fairview(07022) Fort Lee(07024) Franklin Lakes(07417) Franklin Lks(07417) Garfield(07026) Glen Rock(07452) Hack(07601) Hackensack(07601) Harrington Pk(07640) Hasbrouck Heights(07604) Hasbrouck Hts(07604) Haworth(07641) Hillsdale(07642) Hillsdale(07676) Ho Ho Kus(07423) Leonia(07605) Little Ferry(07643) Lodi(07644) Lyndhurst(07071) Mahwah(07430) Mahwah(07495) Maywood(07607) Midland Park(07432) Midland Pk(07432) Montvale(07645) Moonachie(07074) Morsemere(07657) N Arlington(07031) N Milford(07646) New Milford(07646) North Arlington(07031) Palisades Park(07650) Palisades Pk(07650) Paramus(07652) Paramus(07653) Park Ridge(07656) Radburn(07410) Ramsey(07446) Ridgefield(07657) Ridgefield Park(07660) Ridgefield Pk(07660) River Edge(07661) Rochelle Park(07662) Rockleigh(07647) Rutherford(07070) S Hackensack(07606) Saddle Brook(07663) Saddle River(07458) South Hackensack(07606) Teaneck(07666) Tenafly(07670) Teterboro(07608) Teterboro(07699) Wallington(07057) Westwood(07677) Wood Ridge(07075) Wood-Ridge(07075) Wyckoff(07481) Arlington(07032) Bayonne(07002) Bergenline(07087) East Newark(07029) Guttenberg(07093) Harrison(07029) Hoboken(07030) Jersey City(07097) Kearny(07032) North Bergen(07047) Union City(07087) Washington Street(07030) Weehawken(07087) West Arlington(07032) West New York(07093) Woodcliff(07047) Montclair(07043) N Caldwell(07006) Newark(07106) Newark(07107) Newark(07108) Newark(07114) Newark(07175) Bloomfield Belleville Irvington(07111)

My name is Patricia Pallets, I was recommended for Mr. Rafael Gomez from my sister-in-law Wendy Fellows and he's been dealing with her for over 20 years ago and he's an excellent lawyer and I definitely would recommend it to anyone. Thank you.

---------------------------------------

The prior owner, Renault Winery, Inc., filed a petition pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1101-1175. The primary purpose of Chapter 11, which is entitled "reorganization," is the rehabilitation of financially troubled businesses. Kernan v. One Washington Park, 154 N.J. 437, 446, 713 A.2d 411 (1998). Upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the assets of the debtor become part of what is termed the bankruptcy estate of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 541. Broadly overseeing the process is the United States Trustee. 28 U.S.C. § 586, 11 U.S.C. § 307. Shortly after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the United States Trustee conducts a section 341 meeting of creditors in which the debtor is required to appear and answer questions of the United States Trustee and creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 341, 343.

 

In most Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, the United States Trustee does not seek the appointment of a case trustee. Rather, the debtor remains as a "debtor-in-possession." Kernan, supra, 154 N.J. at 446-447, 713 A.2d 411, 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1). With certain limited exceptions, a debtor-in-possession has all the rights and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties of a case trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). Even though a debtor-in-possession, there is a duty of loyalty to creditors. Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 642, 83 S.Ct. 969, 975-76, 10 L.Ed.2d 33, 42 (1963). The debtor-in-possession is a fiduciary for the bankruptcy estate and 129*129 creditors. In re United Healthcare Sys. Inc., 200 F.3d 170, 177 n. 9 (3rd Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1204, 120 S.Ct. 2199, 147 L.Ed.2d 234 (2000). The United States Trustee broadly oversees the process through the promulgation of operating guidelines and reporting requirement to be followed by debtors-in-possession. U.S. Dept. of Justice, United States Trustee Program Policy and Practices Manual, Vol. 3 (July 2016).

 

The taxpayer initially argued that the obligation to file a response to a Chapter 91 request belongs with whomever is the trustee. However, there was not a trustee specifically appointed to the bankruptcy case. Instead, the day-to-day operations of the debtor and the assets of the bankruptcy estate were handled by the debtor-in-possession, Renault Winery, Inc.

 

In Kernan, the New Jersey Supreme Court had to confront this issue in a slightly different context. Kernan slipped and fell on property owned by One Washington Park. Kernan, supra, 154 N.J. at 442, 713 A.2d 411. At the time of the fall, One Washington Park was in reorganization pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. The debtor was not permitted to remain in possession and a case trustee was appointed by the Bankruptcy Court. Id. The Court noted that upon appointment, not only would the case trustee operate the business, the case trustee is automatically substituted for the debtor-in-possession in any pending action, proceeding or matter. Id. at 449, 713 A.2d 411. The case trustee was vested with title to all the debtor's property. Id. at 450, 713 A.2d 411 (citing Hanover Insurance Company v. Tyco Industries, Inc., 500 F.2d 654, 656 (3rd Cir. 1974)). See also Kernan, supra, 154 N.J. at 450, 713 A.2d 411.

 

Hi my name is Aloma Brown Bruns, my attorney is Raphael Gomez and I'm his client. I'm from Jamaica West Indian st. Catherine and I'm pleased with his professionalism work. He helped me with my car accident when I had a car accident he was very efficient and his Secretary's of our on top of the work they know what they're doing. I will recommend them to anyone who has a accident need to be represented. Thank you so much for your good work

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New Jersey, New York, Newark, Hackensack, Paterson, 07606 07601

 

Bankruptcy Attorney in New Jersey | Hackensack - Bergen County - Paterson - Hudson County - New York - Fairview - Secaucus - Newark - Essex County - Passaic County - Paterson - Jersey City - Hoboken - Paramus - South Hackensack - Maywood - and region 07606 07601 07603 07605 07604 07652 07653 07101 07102

 

The New Jersey Bankruptcy Lawyer law firm of Mr. R. Gomez, Attorney at Law has its main office located in Hackensack, New Jersey 07601.

 

This Bergen County Bankruptcy Law Firm has helped thousands of clients with debt problems, car repossessions, foreclosed mortgages, motor vehicle commission (DMV) surcharges, lawsuits, wage garnishments and countless other debt problems which are usually resolved by filing a bankruptcy case in the New Jersey Bankruptcy Courts

 

PASSAIC COUNTY & BERGEN COUNTY & HUDSON COUNTY & Some ESSEX

 

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Ya no se acuerda

Que quería ser de mayor

Ahora es de piedra

Que pierde su color

Pero una piedra nunca apedrea,

Sola se queda quieta

Tan solo es un arma si la disparan

Yemas de manos viejas

 

Es un niño de piedra...

Aquella casa que soñé ,

nunca la voy a construir ,

porqué me faltan los dineros ,

y la hipoteca no me dan.

  

Aquella casa que soñé ,

un simple sueño fué ,

para poderla vender ,

cuando se acabe de hacer .

  

Aquella casa que soñé .

loco debí de estar ,

para pensar ,

un disparate igual .

 

¡ Aquella casa que yo ví !

iluso que yo fuí ,

por quererla para mí ,

sin dinero para comprar .

 

por la dación en pago como solución al problema de las hipotecas

(...or when the big fish eats the small │ ...o cuando el pez grande se merienda al chico)

 

On Large (Portfolio)Portfolio 500px Music jesuscm's favorites Gallery

 

Thanks for the visit, comments, awards, invitations and favourites. Please don't use this image on websites, blogs or other media without my explicit permission.

2011©jesuscm. All rights reserved.

Ilford HP5+ EI1600

(pushed 2 stops)

Nikon FM2n

Nikkor 35mm F/2 AF-D

Kodak HC110-B 11minutes

Tras meses de la interposición de las demandas por 'Gastos Hipotecarios', nos encontramos inmersos en procesos judiciales que la banca sigue empeñada en dilatar y obstaculizar sea como sea.

Aún estamos a tiempo de unir a afectados, y ya que la banca ha ejecutado una estrategia de desinformación a los consumidores para no reclamar, la asociación hace un llamamiento a los miles de hipotecados para que se sumen a las demandas y defiendan sus derechos.

apartamento con vistas (o el ojo del gigante)

especulación? crisis inmobiliaria? hipotécas basura?...

speculation? real estate crisis? subprime mortgages?...

►►Mucho mejor en grande - Much better in larger◄◄

A beautiful reflection of the cute houses in one area of Reykjavík. But the two-for-one concept of this reflection only applies to the mortgage that some are paying these days.

 

I was driving past this place with the intention of taking some pictures by the little marina which is very close by. I saw the reflection with the corner of my eye, stepped on the brake, drove in reverse gear, and left the car running (where it wouldn't be hit), and took this shot. It's just a big puddle after the rain.

 

Exif: ISO 100 ; f/5.6 ; 1/320 ; @14mm

en grande se ve mejor / large is better

 

www.musicandpics.com

(José Luis, afectado por la hipoteca)

 

Don't use this image on Websites/Blog or any other media

without my explicit permission. © All rights reserved, don't use without permission. - Todos los derechos reservados, no usar sin permiso.

  

Mi nombre es Ramona Feliz y el doctor Rafael Gómez es el mejor abogado para divorcio.

---------------------------------------------------

WELLS FARGO FINANCIAL LEASING, INC., Demandante-Demandado,

v.

MISOOK KIM, Demandado-Apelante y

KI C. KIM, Demandado.

No. A-3693-13T1.

Tribunal Superior de Nueva Jersey, División de Apelaciones.

 

Recibido el 24 de marzo de 2015.

Decidido el 1 de abril de 2015.

Oficinas legales de Jae Y. Kim, L.L.C., abogados del apelante (Raymond Marelic, abogado y en el escrito; Sr. Kim, en el escrito).

 

Fleischer, Fleischer & Suglia, abogados del demandado (Allison L. Domowitch, en el escrito).

 

Ante los jueces Fasciale y Hoffman.

 

POR CURIAM.

 

La acusada Misook Kim apela de una orden del 7 de marzo de 2014 que niega su moción para anular una orden que otorga un juicio sumario al demandante. Afirmamos.

 

El demandante obtuvo una sentencia contra Hanna Kim Corporation ("Hanna"). Hanna supuestamente intentó defraudar y evadir a sus acreedores haciendo transferencias posteriores al juicio al acusado y coacusado Ki C. Kim, quien es el esposo del acusado y presidente de Hanna. El demandante esencialmente mantuvo en esta acción que Hanna era una corporación fantasma creada para ocultar las transacciones personales del acusado.

 

El demandante presentó su demanda exigiendo daños bajo la Ley Uniforme de Transferencia Fraudulenta (la "Ley"), N.J.S.A. 25: 2-20 a -34. El demandante intentó perforar el velo corporativo de Hanna buscando cobrar el dinero que Hanna supuestamente transfirió de manera fraudulenta. El coacusado buscó con éxito protección contra el reclamo del demandante al presentar una petición de bancarrota del Capítulo 7 y obtener una descarga. [1] El acusado no buscó una protección similar.

 

El demandante prosiguió con su reclamo únicamente contra el demandado en virtud de la ley. Tanto el demandante como el demandado presentaron mociones para un juicio sumario. En enero de 2014, el tribunal otorgó un juicio sumario al demandante y denegó la moción del acusado.

 

El acusado buscó anular el juicio sumario de conformidad con la Regla 4: 50-1 (d). Ella argumentó que el tribunal carecía de jurisdicción sobre la materia porque el coacusado se había declarado en quiebra. La acusada admitió, sin embargo, que no presentó una petición de quiebra. El demandante sostuvo que su juicio sumario contra el acusado era independiente de cualquier cosa que el coacusado hubiera hecho que condujera a la presentación de la petición del Capítulo 7. El demandante argumentó que obtuvo un fallo contra el acusado basado en transferencias fraudulentas que Hanna había hecho directamente al acusado, sin relación con las transferencias que el coacusado pudo haber hecho, o cualquier transferencia que Hanna pudo haber hecho al coacusado.

 

El juez denegó la moción del acusado para anular el juicio sumario del demandante, ingresó la orden bajo revisión y luego denegó la moción del acusado de reconsideración.

 

En la apelación, la demandada sostiene que la petición del Capítulo 7 de la coacusada impide que la demandante continúe con su reclamo contra ella en virtud de la Ley. Como resultado, la demandada repite su argumento de la Regla 4: 50-1 (d) de que el juez se equivocó al no anular el juicio sumario del demandante porque el tribunal posiblemente carecía de jurisdicción sobre la materia.

 

Después de revisar el expediente y los escritos, llegamos a la conclusión de que el argumento del acusado carece de mérito suficiente para justificar su discusión en una opinión escrita. R. 2: 11-3 (e) (1) (E). Agregamos las siguientes breves observaciones.

 

Al revisar una concesión de juicio sumario, aplicamos el mismo estándar bajo la Regla 4: 46-2 (c) que regía el tribunal de primera instancia. Wilson ex rel. Manzano contra la ciudad de Jersey City, 209 N.J.558, 564 (2012). Aquí, no hay verdaderas cuestiones de hecho material. Debido a que la juez resolvió cuestiones legales, revisamos sus conclusiones sobre cuestiones de derecho de novo. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. de Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

A palabra nostalxia deriva do grego nostos (fogar) e algos (dor). Foi creada a finais do século XVII para describir o estado de ánimo dos soldados suízos que loitaban fóra do seu país, que sentían unha tristeza orixinada polo desexo de volver á súa casa Cando se mira polo retrovisor da vida, temos moitos motivos para a nostalxia ,algúns episodios de outrora parecen perfectos. Unha especie de paraíso perdido .Quizas por temos tan poucos momentos de felicidade na vida que case podemos lembralos todos. E por iso os idealizamos Así que estamos ante un sentimento tramposo, porque non existen máis paraísos que os que se inventa a nosa memoria Non se estraña unha tarde da infancia , senón a inocencia e a alegría coa que se vivía de neno. A pequenas doses pode ser reconfortante para nosa estima pero temos que poñerlle un limite e deixar de idealizar o pasado. Se unha persoa instálase nel , anula o seu presente e hipoteca o seu futuro. E non todo era perfecto nos vellos tempos.

de tiempos inmemoriales

vivieron como pudieron

aquellos ancestrales

seres humanos, ..............

...que ya tenían bastante

con aguantar pocos años

¡ la hipoteca vino después !

que fué invento del banquero

para quedarse con el dinero

¡¡ cómo vivieron " aquellos " !!

con el Uro, Bisonte y Mamut

que sin caberles en la cueva

pintaban en la pared su silueta .

 

DEBO AGRADECER, QUE NO SE LLEVEN LA FOTO, LOS QUE NO HAGAN COMENTARIO. HE ELIMINADO CUANTAS SE LLEVARON SIN ESTA EXIGENCIA. GRACIAS!!!

 

HOULD BE THANKFUL THAT NOT TAKE THE PHOTO FOR THOSE WHO DO NOT COMMENT. HE IS LEADING MANY DELETED WITHOUT THIS REQUIREMENT. Thank you !!!

 

HOULD庆幸不会把那些没有注释的照片。他正带领着许多删除的无此项要求。谢谢

 

SANTANDER BANK, N.A., Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GARRETT F. GRIGGS and LAURA F. GRIGGS, Defendants-Appellants, and

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant.

 

No. A-0705-15T1.

 

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

 

Submitted July 25, 2017.

Decided August 4, 2017.

  

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Union County, Docket No. F-11977-10.

 

Garrett F. Griggs and Laura F. Griggs, appellants pro se.

 

Phelan Hallinan Diamond & Jones, PC, attorneys for respondent (Sonya Gidumal Chazin, on the brief).

 

Before Judges Reisner and Suter.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36​-3.

 

PER CURIAM.

 

Defendants Garrett and Laura Griggs (defendants) appeal an August 21, 2015 order that denied their motion to vacate a May 11, 2015 final judgment foreclosing their interest in certain residential real estate. We affirm.

 

I.

In September 2006, defendants executed a $315,000 note to U.S. Mortgage Corporation (U.S. Mortgage) and a non-purchase money mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for U.S. Mortgage, on a residential property in the City of Union, Union County. The mortgage was recorded.

 

Defendants defaulted on the note in August 2009. In October 2009, a notice of intention to foreclose the mortgage was sent to defendants at their address in Union, which advised defendants they were in default and the amount needed to cure.

 

Defendants' mortgage was assigned by MERS to Sovereign Bank in February 2010 and recorded. Also in February 2010, Sovereign Bank filed a foreclosure complaint, which was personally served on defendants. Defendants did not respond and a default was entered.

 

Sovereign Bank, N.A. was substituted for Sovereign Bank. Plaintiff Santander Bank, N.A. (plaintiff), formerly known as Sovereign Bank, N.A., filed an amended foreclosure complaint in December 2013. Defendants were served by mail when personal service on defendants was not successful. Defendants acknowledge receiving the amended foreclosure complaint by mail on March 10, 2014. Defendants did not answer the amended complaint, explaining that they were "trying to get in touch with the mortgage lender for some time" and were both ill. A default was entered against defendants on December 2, 2014.

 

Plaintiff requested entry of a final judgment of foreclosure in May 2015. Defendants claim they did not receive notice of this, but the record shows the notice of motion was sent to defendants' address in Union. When there was no opposition to the application, a final judgment of foreclosure was entered on May 11, 2015. wclaim not to have received a copy of the final judgment, but the record shows it was mailed to their address in Union.

 

Efforts commenced by plaintiff to sell the property at a sheriff's sale. Defendants filed a motion to vacate the final judgment of foreclosure, but on August 21, 2015, the trial court denied defendants' motion. The foreclosed property was sold to plaintiff on August 26, 2015.

 

On appeal, defendants contend the court erred in denying the motion to vacate the final judgment of foreclosure because they "raised legally sufficient questions as to the merits of respondent's foreclosure action and legal justification." Defendants also claim plaintiff lacked standing to foreclose.

 

We do not know whether the court issued a memorandum decision or placed its reasons on the record when it denied defendants' motion, but the record does not include the court's findings nor have the parties supplied a transcript or written decision. See R. 1:7-4(a) ("The court shall by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried without a jury. . . ."). We could remand the case to the trial court for clarification, but under Rule 2:10​-5, we also "may exercise such original jurisdiction as is necessary to the complete determination of any matter on review." Here, the record enables us to resolve the issues without a remand.

 

We review the trial court's order denying defendants' Rule 4:50-1 motion to vacate the final judgment of foreclosure, under an abuse of discretion standard. Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994) (citations omitted). Defendants have not disputed the amount owed in the final judgment of foreclosure or that the mortgage is in default.

Buenos días, mi nombre es Jorge Romero, aquí con suerte abonado, estoy aquí con el abogado Gómez, un buen abogado y fue un bom caso, me sacó mucho dinero. Se los recomiendo de buena.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

CAPÍTULO 13 DE BANCARROTA

ABOGADO DE QUIEBRA EN HACKENSACK NUEVA JERSEY

 

El Capítulo 13, Título 11, Código de los Estados Unidos, más comúnmente conocido como Capítulo 13, es un capítulo del Código de Bancarrota de los Estados Unidos que rige una forma de bancarrota en los Estados Unidos. El Capítulo 13 permite a las personas someterse a una reorganización financiera supervisada por un tribunal federal de quiebras. El Código de Bancarrota anticipa el objetivo del Capítulo 13 de permitir a los deudores que reciben ingresos una rehabilitación del deudor siempre que cumplan con un plan aprobado por el tribunal. Esto contrasta con los objetivos del Capítulo 7 que ofrece un alivio inmediato y completo de muchas deudas opresivas. Es una forma de consolidación de deuda.

  

ELECCIÓN DEL CAPÍTULO

 

Una persona que está muy endeudada puede declararse en bancarrota ya sea bajo el Capítulo 7 (liquidación o quiebra directa), bajo el Capítulo 13 (reorganización), el Capítulo 12 (reorganización de los agricultores familiares) o bajo el Capítulo 11.

 

Los deudores también pueden ser obligados a declararse en quiebra por los acreedores en el caso de una quiebra involuntaria, pero solo bajo los Capítulos 7 u 11. Sin embargo, en la mayoría de los casos, el deudor puede elegir bajo qué capítulo presentar. El deudor también puede optar por convertir a otro capítulo de un 7 u 11 cuando se ve obligado a una quiebra involuntaria.

 

Las características financieras del deudor y el tipo de alivio buscado juega un papel tremendo en la elección de los capítulos. En algunos casos, el deudor simplemente no puede presentar una declaración en virtud del Capítulo 13, ya que carece de los ingresos disponibles necesarios para financiar un plan viable del Capítulo 13 (ver más abajo). Además, la Sección 109 (e) del Título 11 del Código de los Estados Unidos establece límites de deuda para que las personas sean elegibles para presentar en virtud del Capítulo 13 los límites de deuda para presentar el Capítulo 13 de deudas no garantizadas de menos de $ 360,475.00 y deudas garantizadas de menos de $ 1,081,400.00. Estos límites de deuda están sujetos a aumentos anuales en el costo de vida y representan valores actualizados periódicamente.

 

Según el Capítulo 13, el deudor propone un plan para pagar a sus acreedores durante un período de 3 a 5 años. Este plan escrito detalla todas las transacciones (y sus duraciones) que ocurrirán, y el reembolso de acuerdo con el plan debe comenzar dentro de treinta a cuarenta y cinco días después de que el caso haya comenzado. Durante este período, sus acreedores no pueden intentar cobrar la deuda previamente incurrida del individuo, excepto a través del tribunal de quiebras. En general, el individuo puede conservar su propiedad y sus acreedores terminan con menos dinero del que se les debe.

es posible que vendieran la " embarcación ",

que hoy en día, .......es lo que está al uso ,

¡¡ yo,.....¡me voy !...... y ahí os quedáis !!

que ayer,....¡ vendí el negocio ! .

Vosotros os quedáis con la hipoteca

y, los créditos que me fueron concedidos ;

con los que me pegaré la vida padre,

un poco más allá , que del Caribe

donde, tengo asegurado buen sol

hamaca y " chamaca " ,.............

............que me abanique de día

.....i y,....,, por la noche su calor !

 

WELLS FARGO, N.A., Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SHERRI Y. SCAFE, Defendant-Appellant.

 

No. A-0503-15T3.

 

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

 

Submitted February 7, 2017.

Decided August 10, 2017.

  

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Camden County, Docket No. F-023370-12.

 

Sherri Y. Scafe, appellant pro se.

 

Phelan Hallinan Diamond & Jones, PC, attorneys for respondent (Brian Yoder, on the brief).

 

Before Judges Suter and Guadagno.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36​-3.

 

PER CURIAM.

 

Pro se defendant, Sherri Y. Scafe, also known as Nin el Ameen Bey[1], appeals from the August 14, 2015 Chancery Division order denying her motion to vacate a June 9, 2014 final judgment of foreclosure. We affirm.

 

On January 7, 2008, defendant executed a promissory note to AmTrust Bank (AmTrust) for repayment of a loan in the amount of $288,900. The note was secured by a non-purchase money mortgage on real property located at 60 Orlando Drive, Sicklerville, in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for AmTrust. The mortgage was recorded in the Camden County Clerk's Office on January 14, 2008. MERS, as nominee for AmTrust, subsequently assigned the mortgage to plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

 

In September 2011, defendant defaulted on the required monthly payments and Wells Fargo Home Mortgage sent defendant a notice of intention to foreclose dated October 9, 2011, by regular and certified mail at the mortgaged premises.

 

After defendant failed to cure the default, plaintiff filed a complaint for foreclosure on October 17, 2012. Defendant was served by regular and certified mail at the mortgaged premises on April 29, 2013. Defendant failed to file responsive pleadings and a default was entered against her on September 5, 2013. On February 20, 2014, plaintiff mailed notice of entry of default to defendant.

 

On March 4, 2014, defendant filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, but the matter was dismissed by the bankruptcy court twenty days later. In May 2014, plaintiff moved for a final judgment of foreclosure. While that motion was pending, defendant attempted to remove the matter to federal district court. On June 18, 2014, District Judge Robert B. Kugler remanded the matter to the Chancery Division.

 

Final judgment of foreclosure was entered on June 9, 2014 and a copy of the judgement was mailed to defendant at the mortgaged premises. A sheriff's sale was scheduled for August 20, 2014, but defendant filed a second petition for bankruptcy on August 1, 2014. After the bankruptcy court entered a discharge on June 19, 2015, defendant moved to vacate the June 9, 2014 judgment of foreclosure and dismiss the foreclosure complaint. The Chancery judge denied defendant's motion on August 14, 2015.

 

On appeal, defendant claims the Chancery judge erred in not vacating the judgment of foreclosure; the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the foreclosure judgment; plaintiff failed to join an indispensable party; and defendant pled a meritorious defense.

 

None of defendant's arguments have sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in our opinion beyond these brief observations. R. 2:11​-3(e)(1)(E).

 

During oral argument on her motion to vacate the judgment of foreclosure, defendant objected to Wells Fargo being a party to the matter and argued that the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), should have been joined as a party. When counsel for plaintiff noted that defendant had not challenged plaintiff's standing in her moving papers, defendant claimed that plaintiff failed to serve her with "notice of acceleration." The Chancery judge then read the acceleration provision in the mortgage to defendant and explained that the October 9, 2011, notice of intent to foreclose was served one year before the foreclosure complaint was filed. Because defendant failed to contest the foreclosure and default was entered, the judge explained that defendant waived any challenge to standing or to the sufficiency of the notice.

Almost six years after defendant defaulted on this mortgage, the matter is still pending, with defendant continuing to reside in the mortgaged premises without paying the mortgage or property taxes.[2]

 

We affirm the denial of defendant's motion to vacate the June 9, 2014 final judgment of foreclosure and direct that, absent a stay by the Supreme Court, a sheriff's sale be scheduled within sixty days of the filing of this opinion.

 

[1] When the Chancery judge addressed defendant as Sherri Scafe, she promptly corrected the judge, stating her name was Nin El Ameen Bey.

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